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STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN C. WINTERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
W. S. HATCH CO., 
Defendant-Respondent., 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Allen C. Wintecrs appeals from a judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, granting respondent a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict and against plaintiff of no cause of action. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant obtained a jury verdict on special inter-
rogatories for damages for personal injuries against re-
spondent and thereafter the Court below granted re-
Case No. 
I 13997 
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spondent's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the Court below and 
reinstatement of the verdict of the jury with directions 
that judgment be entered thereon. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant filed a complaint seeking damages from 
defendant for personal injuries arising out of an accident 
caused by respondent in the State of Nevada (R-138). 
Thereafter a trial by jury was held. Respondent's mo-
tion for a directed verdict at the close of the case was 
denied (T. 441). Appellant was given judgment on the 
special verdict (R-54-59). The jury was submitted the 
issues of respondent's negligence, appellant's contribu-
tory negligence, and damages on special interrogatories. 
All eight jurors found respondent to be negligent and 
that the negligence was the proximate cause of appellant's 
injuries (R-55). Six of the jurors found appellant not 
to be negligent while two found he was (R-55). 
After the entry of the judgment respondent sought 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alterna-
tive a new trial. The Court below granted respondent's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, set 
aside the judgment on special verdict, and gave judg-
ment against appellant of no cause of action (R-13). 
The motion for new trial was denied (R-2). 
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THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION AND DENIED APPELLANT HIS 
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL BY GRANTING 
RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT. 
The law in Utah and Nevada is virtually indistin-
guishable in considering the standards governing the 
granting of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
This Court has often dealt with varying fact situa-
tions and determined the propriety of a lower court's 
ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. In Koer v. Mayjield Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 
431 P. 2d 566 (1967), a slip and fall case, the plaintiff 
got a jury verdict and the trial court granted a judgment 
n.o.v. for defendant. The jury had the issues of the de-
fendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence before it on special interrogatories and found for 
plaintiff on both issues. This Court, on the evidence in 
in the case, sustained the lower court's action, but pointed 
out that a trial count,, in passing on a motion for a judg-
ment n.o.v., can only enter such a judgment for one 
reason — "the absence of any substantial evidence to 
support the verdict." This Court then examined in detail 
the evidence, as must be done in each case, and concluded 
that there was no substantial evidence to support the 
jury's verdict. 
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This Court has also recognized the other basic con-
siderations involved in granting a judgment n.o.v. In 
Schow v. Guardtone, 18 Utah 2d 135, 417 P. 2d 693 
(1966), this court noted that trial courts should exercise 
reluctance and caution in interfering with the parties' 
desires for a jury trial. Whenever a judgment n.o.v. is 
granted, as in Schow and this case, the right to jury trial 
is eliminated entirely. This Court was acutely aware of 
this in Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P. 2d 77 
(1964), when it said, 394 P. 2d at 79: 
In appraising this action of the trial court, 
it is important to distinguish between the grant-
ing of a new trial and the entering of a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. As to the 
former, the trial court is indeed endowed with 
a wide latitude of discretion in granting a new 
trial when he thinks the jury's vredict results 
in manifest injustice. This power is necessary 
to fulfill his function of maintaining general 
supervision over litigation to guard against mis-
carriages of justice which sometimes occur at 
the hands of juries. Allowing this broad discre-
tion in the trial court to grant new trials does 
not deprive the parties of a fair trial by jury, 
but on the contrary, assures it. However, the 
granting of a judgment n.o.v. does completely 
override the jury and their verdict and thus 
effectively deprives the party of his right to a 
jury trial. Therefore, this can properly be done 
only when under the evidence and the law there 
is no reasonable basis in the evidence, or lack of 
it, to justify the verdict given. 
This Court more recently dealt with this same issue 
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in Flyrm v. Harlin Const. Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P. 
2d 356 (1973). In that case the plaintiff received a jury 
verdict on two issues. The trial court granted defendant's 
motion previously made for a directed verdict on one of 
those issues. While a judgment n.o.v. was not involved, 
the same standards apply. See, e.g. Koer, supra. This 
Court critically analyzed the trial court's reasoning in 
granting defendant's motion and reversed his action and 
reinstated the verdict and ordered judgment thereon. 
This Court noted that the court was being very con-
scientious to see justice done, but in so doing the tirial 
court usurped the jury's function. The trial court com-
mented on credibility of witnesses, a prerogative be-
longing solely to the jury. This Court stated the rules 
and rationale well: 
We have no doubt that it is salutary for a 
trial judge to desire to be actively involved in 
the trial and to be eager to see that justice is 
done. Nevertheless, under our system of justice ,^ 
it is neither essential nor desirable that the reso-
lution of disputed questions of fact be forced 
into the exact mold of thought of any particular 
individual or judge. When a party has so re-
quested, he is entitled to a trial by a jury of his 
fellow citizens. In order that that right be safe-
guarded as it should be, it is essential that the 
jury have the exclusive prerogative of passing 
upon the credibility of the evidence and of de-
termining the facts. 
Therefore, no matter how ardent may be 
the trial judge's desire to see that justice is done 
from his own point of view, he has an obligation 
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of judicial restraint: to make allowance for the 
fact that other reasonable minds might arrive at 
a different conclusion than his own. This re-
quirement of disciplined objectivity, in letting 
someone else have their way, and of letting jus-
tice be done from someone else's point of view, 
is one of the most difficult to achieve, and also 
one of the highest and most desirable of judicial 
qualities. Yet, unless this principle is applied 
in practical operation, the right of trial by jury 
becomes but a delusion. The jury is permitted 
to go meaninglessly through all of the procedures 
of the trial and render the verdict, but only on 
the undisclosed condition that, unless its verdict 
agrees with the thinking of the trial judge, it 
will be set aside and held for naught. This case 
with everything involved therein, including eight 
days of trial, is a prime example of the futility 
and frustrations in such procedure. It offers to 
plaintiff the hollow satisfaction of vindicating 
his contention that defendants had wrongfully 
terminated his contract, but deprives him of any 
material redress therefor. This is not what was 
intended by the right of trial by jury. 
It has long been established in our law that 
a court should not take the case from the jury 
where there is any substantial dispute in the 
evidence on issues of fact, but can properly do 
so only when the matter is so plain that there 
really is no conflict in the evidence upon which 
reasonable minds could differ. As was said for 
this court long ago by the greatly respected 
Justice Prick: 
. . . unless the question is free from doubt, 
the court cannot pass upon it as a matter 
of law . . , 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
. . . if . . . the court is in doubt whether 
reasonable men , . . . might arrive at different 
conclusions, then this very doubt determines 
the question to be one of fact for the jury 
and not one of law for the court. 
It should be plain from what has been said 
above that there was such a dispute in the evi-
dence here, and that the court was correct in his 
rulings during the trial: in admitting the evi-
dence, and in submitting the issues to the jury. 
Further, in passing on a motion for a judgment n.o.v. 
the court is to review the evidence and all inferences 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict. 
See, e.g. Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P. 2d 209 
(1955). Some courts have also held that even if the 
evidence is undisputed a judgment n.o.v. may be im-
proper if different inferences may reasonably be drawn 
therefrom. See, e.g., Chavira v. Carnation, 77 N. M. 467, 
423 P. 2d 988 (1970). 
All of the above standards and rules governing judg-
ments notwithstanding the verdict are true as to Nevada 
law. That is, basically, if the facts are disputed or rea-
sonable, men could draw different inferences from the 
facts, the question is one of fact for the jury and not 
one of law for the court. 
If there is evidence "tending to support the verdict, 
or where there is a conflict of evidence, so that the jury 
could properly decide, either way, even though the con-
flict is such that the court would be justified in granting 
a new trial," a judgment n.o.v. is not proper. Dudley 
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v. Prima, 84 Nev. 549, 445 P. 2d 31 (1968). See also, 
for the same rules as above stated, Sheeketski v. Bortoli, 
86 Nev. 704, 475 P. 2d 675 (1970). 
It is of course clear that all of the above cases are 
guidelines and standards but that each case must turn 
on its own facts. In some of the above cases the court 
concluded, applying the above standards, that there was 
no substantial or reasonable evidence to support the jury's 
verdict. In some cases there was. In this case the issues 
the court faced and the issues this court must face are 
the negligence of the defendant and the contributory 
negligence of appellant. The lower court did not com-
ment on which ground the judgment n.o.v. was granted, 
nor does the judgment itself reflect whether the court 
ruled appellant negligent as a matter of law or respon-
dent not negligent as a matter of law. 
As to respondent's negligence the jury unanimously 
found respondent negligent. The drivers of respondent's 
truck, Doran Higley and De Roy Higley each testified 
that they looked before pulling out and didn't see any-
thing and then they pulled out and were hit. 
De Roy Higley testified as follows: 
T. Page 263, Lines 27-30; T. Page 264, Lines 1-21: 
Q. Is — I say, teU me what then occurred, 
what happens? 
A. Well, we started to merge and I def-
initely looked and I didn't see anything, and he 
made the comment that — or I did, I suppose 
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that, "Well, there's nothing coming," so we were 
on our way. 
Q. Well, did your partner look with you? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. And by what means did he look? 
A. Well, by turning his head to the left. 
A. Yes, sir, uh-huh. 
Q. Which would be looking west? 
A. Uh^huh. 
Q. You were proceeding down the road 
that enters onto the highway; is that right? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And how did you look? 
A. Well, I looked through my mirrors, but 
also by leaning forward as far as I can and look-
ing back to the left. 
Q. You looked in your mirrors and looked 
outside the window and back to your left; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
T. Page 266, Lines 3-6: 
Q. Did you look more than once? 
A. Well, yes, I did. 
Q. You did? 
A. I did. After I entered the traffic lane 
and I still never seen anything. 
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From an analysis of the pireceding testimony of the 
driver, he indicated that he looked before merging and 
saw nothing. He obviously did not see the appellant's 
vehicle which was clearly there to be seen. 
Applying the above rules, it is abundantly clear that 
the testimony of De Roy Higley alone is substantial evi-
dence to support the jury's verdict as to respondent's 
negligence. Clearly the lower court applying the sub-
stantial evidence test erred reversibly if it granted a 
judgment n.o.v. if it ruled as a matter of law respondent 
was not negligent. The jury, upon proper instructions, 
unanimously concluded respondent was negligent. To 
rule that as a matter of law respondent was not negligent 
would be to say the entire jury did not have a reasonable 
mind on it. In this case the court denied respondent's 
motion for a directed verdict at the end of the case. This 
would indicate, in the language of this court from Flynn, 
supra, that the matter was not "free from doubt" and 
that the lower court had a question as to what reasonable 
minds would do so he submitted it to the jury, who, 
being reasonable minds, decided the matter. 
The identical analysis applies to the issue of appel-
lant's contributory negligence. Reasonable minds decided 
six to two that appellant was not negligent. The testi-
mony that the jury could have relied on, and the in-
ferences therefrom, is extensive and has its source in 
various witnesses. The following is exemplary: 
Testimony of Al Winters; T. Page 47, Lines 28-30, 
T. Page 48, Lines 1-3, 21-25: 
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A. I — when I left the cafe I got in my 
truck and I drove down the street a ways and 
turned up on the freeway, and I was going down 
the freeway, I can remember drinking some 
coffee not far out of Reno, and then beyond 
there — just — it's vague, but I remember some 
traffic, it seems like — it seems I can recall 
passing another truck somewhere. 
A. No, sir. The last thing I can say for sure 
that I remember was going by a truck not far 
from there. I can't say exactly how far back it 
was, but I can almost definitely say I did pass 
— remember definitely passing that truck, like 
I say it's quite vague. 
T. Page 92, Lines 29, 30; T. Page 93, Lines 1-9: 
Q. No, I believe you testified on direct 
examination that before the accident you recall 
passing another vehicle; is that right? 
A. Yes, sir, I believe it is. 
Q. Do you recall what kind of vehicle it 
was? 
A. I believe it was a semi, a set of trucks, 
I think it was a tractor with two trailers. 
Q. And do you recall how long a period of 
time it took you to pass that vericle? 
A. Not really, no, sir. It seems like I can 
remember going by it fairly fast like it was going 
a bit slower. 
Testimony of James Owen Frei; T. Page 197, Lines 
13-21: 
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A. If we — we ran this test to determine -
the visibility factor and also to get the speed I 
factor, but as we approached back in this area • 
that's here, we flashed our light in the truck I 
was riding it, and this second truck that was 
stopped started to accelerate so both vehicles 
would reach the area the accident occurred in at 
approximately the same time, and with him 
moving I could say the visibility was obstructed,, 
and then the taillights were at all times visible, 
was only obstructed for 500 or a thousand feet. 
T. Page 215, Lines 18-30: 
Q. Did you ever pass another truck as you 
were proceeding to that area? 
A. No. We were passed by several cars, 
but not trucks. 
Q. And which lane of traffic were you pro-
ceeding in? 
A. We were in the right-hand lane. 
Q. Did you ever pass another truck and go 
to the inside lane and then come back to the out-
side lane? 
A. No, we didn't. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether 
your view would ever have been obstructed had 
you passed a truck? 
A. It would have been temporarily ob-
structed. 
Q. Depending on where you passed the ve-
hicle? 
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Testimony of Douglas McNaught, T. Page 239, Lines 
9-13: 
Q. Do you recall seeing clearance lights 
on either truck? 
A. I can't honestly recall seeing clearance 
lights, but I can only say in my own mind for 
me to recognize them as trucks — 
Mr. McNaught after the accident testified concern-
ing his recollection of the lights on the Haibchco vehicle: 
T. Page 241, Lines 25, 26: 
A. I was able to make out the rear end of 
the tank truck, whether the lights were on or 
not, I can't recall. 
Testimony of Doran L. Higley, T. Page 278, Lines 
6-30; T. Page 279, Lines 1-10: 
Q. How many times on April 24 of 1974 did 
you testify that — or April 25 of 1974 did you 
testify that you brought your vehicle to a stop 
prior to entering the highway? 
MR. JENSEN: I will object to this as 
argumentative, repetitive. He has gone into this. 
The witness has admitted changing a certain 
number of times. 
THE COURT: Well, the objection — what 
do you claim for this? The witness has testified 
that he — he changed his mind. His recollection 
at the time of the deposition was taken was that 
he did stop. 
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MR. ATHAY: It's a prior inconsistent 
statement. I think the Jury is entitled to know 
how many times he made that prior inconsistent 
statement. That's what I claim for it. 
THE COURT: Well, the fact that he made 
it more than once on the same day, I think the 
objection is well taken. It's sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Athay) Mr. Higley, is your 
recollection better now than it was on April 25 
with respect to this incident? 
A. I would say so. 
Q. It is better now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it better now because it's been re-
freshed by some other documents? 
A. Well, it was proven by a tachograph for 
one thing. 
Q. That's with respect to the stopping? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How about the other areas of your tes-
timony? 
A. Well, I am in doubt. 
Q. You are in doubt? 
A. Such as the lights, yes. I don't know 
really. I know they were on. I could say that 
honestly. When we stopped, come to rest, I don't 
know if the trailer lights were on. 
Testimony of David Lord: 
An independent expert, David Lord, attempted to 
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reconstruct the accident. The following testimony can 
be taken one of two ways: 
1. That appellant, Allen C. Winters, had passed a 
vehicle and was proceeding in a general left to right di-
rection from the inside to the outside lane just prior to 
impact, or, 
2. That appellant, Allen C. Winters, had begun to 
take some evasive action by heading his vehicle towards 
the side of the road in an effort to avoid a collision with 
the defendants' Hatchco vehicle. 
T. Page 312, Lines 4-24: 
A. 27-P is a gouge on asphalt, the photo-
graph which I took in May, 1971. 26-P is a 
scrape which is a close-up I took in 1971. 
Q. Is there any particular angle that those 
marks proceeded on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At a general left to right movement? 
MR. JENSEN: Well, I am going to object 
to any further testimony on the grounds that 
there is no showing as to their relationship to 
his area. 
MR. ATHAY: I am laying the foundation 
to do that. That's why I am proceeding. 
MR. JENSEN: I move the last answer be 
stricken, Your Honor, as immaterial at this 
point and no foundation shown. 
THE COURT: Go ahead and show your 
foundation as to what the marks are. 
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Q. (By Mr. Athay) 0. K. Where were 
the — can you describe the direction of the 
marks? 
A. In a general left to right direction on 
the highway. 
T. Page 321, Lines 22-30: 
Q. Now, Mr. Lord, did you reach any con-
clusions with respect to the direction which the 
F & B truck was driving? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what factors did you rely upon to 
reach that conclusion? 
A. Photographs of damage, the photo-
graphs of the skid marks, the skid marks that 
I observed at the scene, the chops, the gouges, 
the photograph of damage to the F & B truck. 
T. Page 322, Lines 1-30: 
Q. Would you step down and indicate 
quickly and briefly to the Jury which photo-
graphs best exhibit that which you have just 
described? 
A. 0. K. All of them tell a little bit. 
These three — 
Q. Identify the exhibits as you use them. 
A. Plaintiff's 17, plaintiff's 29 and plain-
tiff's 14. First of all, in plaintiff's 17 which is 
a shot of the front of the F & B truck, you are 
looking at it from the left front sort of on an 
angle toward the front of the truck, you can see 
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the damage carries considerably deeper on the 
left side of the truck. You can see the outline 
of the tank there which places it coming into 
it cm an angle. You see a brief outline of the 
tank here, heavier damage on the left side. It 
come into it at an attitude exposing more on 
the left siide of the tank — or the left side of 
the vehicle to the tank. You can see a rough 
outline of the tank here. 
Here is the radiator which made the per-
pendicular marks on the back of the tank. What 
I am saying is this: If this represented the 
front of the F & B truck and this represented 
the rear of it — of the tank, it came in — 
Q. Which photographs are you referring to? 
A. This would be the F & B. I am using 
the photographs of the truck. This was the 
front of the F & B and this was the rear of the 
tank, the same is at an attitude such as this. 
That's why they have much deeper damage in 
the rear — or excuse me — on the left side of 
the F & B truck. He drove on it. This is fur-
ther evidence by the wheel that we have looked 
at. It's been moved from the left to the right. 
T. Page 323, Lines 1-7: 
A. . . . It would take quite a bit of force 
moving toward the right here of the truck to 
break that axle and to move those wheels off 
to the right as they have done. This would re-
quire left to right movement. 
Also the characteristics of damage on the 
rear of the tanker shows a right to left — or 
excuse me — a left to right movement. 
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Respondent put in evidence that appellant must 
have been negligent or he would have seen respondent's 
clearance lights. Doran Higley (T. 277) and De Roy 
Htgley (R-405) testified the lights were on on their truck 
when they pulled out. However, the matter is not free 
from doubt. Another witness said he wasn't sure the 
lights were on (T. 239). Further, as this court noted 
the general rule in Flyrm, supra, the jury did not have 
to believe such evidence. To say they should have is to 
usurp their function as being the sole judges of witness 
credibility. \ 
Thus, as with the issue of respondent's negligence, 
there is reasonable, substantial evidence, and inferences 
therefrom, that reasonable minds could find that plain-
tiff was not negligent. Reasonable minds so found in the 
jury room and the fact that the trial court agreed with 
the two jurors who felt appellant negligent is not an 
adequate reason under the law to nullify the jury sys-
tem. Trial by jury should not be so easily disposed with 
because the thinking of the jury did not agree with that 
of the tiral court. 
In short, in this case there were two basic issues, 
defendant's negligence and appellant's contributory neg-
ligence, and there was a conflict in the evidence or those 
issues upon which reasonable minds could differ, as wit-
nessed by the jury's six to two vote on one of those 
issues. Because that is so, it was reversible error to grant 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullify the 
jury system. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, that the court below 
erred and abused its discretion in granting a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict for respondent, appellant 
respectfully submits that the judgment of the court be-
low be reversed, the jury verdict be reinstated, and that 
judgment issue thereon. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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